Application programming interfaces have become the primary surface of modern applications, which makes them a primary attack surface. Authentication alone does not secure an API. Proper authorisation must be checked per request, Los Bebes because improper access control remains a leading cause of breach. Request throttling plus strict input validation close the bulk of what is left.
Products engineered for reliable broadband performs badly on constrained networks. Designing for resilience requires treating the network as unavailable by default, small payloads and sensible fallbacks. What this produces benefits every user, and not just constrained markets.
Contemporary software is largely constructed more than they are written. Open source dependencies account for the majority of the code in production. Each dependency introduces the risk profile of whoever wrote it. The practical defences are pinned versions and lockfiles, continuous scanning together with scrutinising new dependencies prior to use.
Most breaches trace back to decisions made instead of coding mistakes. Structured threat modeling poses four basic questions before development begins: what are we building, what could an attacker do, what will we do about it then did we do a good job. Retrofitting security is dramatically more costly than getting it right initially.
Selecting a development partner determines considerably more than delivery timelines. Ask about their security process: whether threat modeling happens as opposed to security is an afterthought. Establish code ownership plus the arrangements when the project ends. Clear documentation is worth greater value than raw speed.
Products engineered for reliable broadband performs badly on constrained networks. Designing for resilience requires treating the network as unavailable by default, small payloads and sensible fallbacks. What this produces benefits every user, and not just constrained markets.
Contemporary software is largely constructed more than they are written. Open source dependencies account for the majority of the code in production. Each dependency introduces the risk profile of whoever wrote it. The practical defences are pinned versions and lockfiles, continuous scanning together with scrutinising new dependencies prior to use.
Most breaches trace back to decisions made instead of coding mistakes. Structured threat modeling poses four basic questions before development begins: what are we building, what could an attacker do, what will we do about it then did we do a good job. Retrofitting security is dramatically more costly than getting it right initially.
Selecting a development partner determines considerably more than delivery timelines. Ask about their security process: whether threat modeling happens as opposed to security is an afterthought. Establish code ownership plus the arrangements when the project ends. Clear documentation is worth greater value than raw speed.